Rawls's Defense of the
CHAPTER
EIGHT of ECONOMIC JUSTICE by Stephen Nathanson [Prentice Hall, 1998]
In this chapter, I will consider some
of the central ideas developed by John Rawls in his book A Theory of Justice [Harvard
University Press, 1971]
There are several reasons for discussing Rawls's views at this point.
First, many people regard A Theory of
Justice as the most important philosophical work on justice in this
century. Second, because Rawls defends a form of welfare state, his theory can
help us deepen our understanding of the moral basis for the welfare state. This
is especially important because welfare state institutions have been subjected
to much hostile criticism. lf Rawls's theory can help
expose the flaws in these criticisms, it will provide a valuable addition to my
discussion.
Finally, by examining Rawls's theory,
we can begin to approach the question of how extensive a welfare state is
required by justice. Many different kinds of welfare state are possible. Some
provide minimal resources to their citizens, while others are very generous. We
need to know which type is required by justice. Only by determining this can we
evaluate the economic systems of actual societies and decide which ones, if
any, are just. We can look to Rawls's theory for guidance here, since it
contains both a justification for a liberal democratic welfare state and a
criterion for deciding how much a welfare state should provide to its citizens.
RAWLS'S METHOD
Rawls's justification for the welfare
state has some distinctive features. In order to clarify them, it will be
useful to contrast Rawls's method of argument with the method I have used in
this book. I have proceeded by identifying the primary moral values that
underlie major arguments for and against different economic systems: the
promotion of well-being, the allocation of goods in accord with desert, and
the protection of liberty. My argument proceeds by comparing each system's
success in advancing these values. It is a cumulative argument, resting on
several different values and a mixture of theoretical and practical
considerations. While I have tried to argue carefully and systematically,
there is a certain lack of unity in my approach, since it focuses on multiple factors
that need to be weighed and balanced. Recognizing that many different factors
and values are relevant, I try to wade through the plethora of relevant
reasons, impose some order on them, and then, by evaluating the most central
arguments, arrive at a conclusion.
Rawls employs a different, quite
distinctive method of argument. While he sometimes considers familiar arguments
and values, his basic method involves the construction of a single criterion
for evaluating different conceptions of justice.
Rawls's criterion derives from the
social contract tradition in political philosophy. He argues that the correct
principles of justice are those that would be agreed to by people designing the
basic institutions of their society. Instead simply asking which principles of
justice are true or which ones we appeal to in ordinary life, Rawls asks which
principles we would choose if we were writing the social contract that
contained the fundamental rules to govern our society.
Rawls's theory contains two main parts.
The first part defends the social contract method and describes the conditions
under which people make the choice of principles. The second part describes the
principles of justice and defends them by showing why they would be chosen for inclusion in an
ideal social contract.
THE ORIGINAL POSITION
If we ask what principles people would
choose to govern their society, it may not be clear how this will help us find
the correct principles of justice. After
all, people disagree about what the principles of justice are and what kind of
social, political, and economic system justice requires. If we simply ask what principles
people would choose to govern their society, We will get many different answers
rather than a single one.
In order to solve this problem, Rawls
proposes that we describe the situation in which people choose principles in a
special way that differs from actual circumstances. Rawls calls his theory
"justice as fairness" because the situation in which the principles
will be chosen must be fair. In addition, it must possess other features that
make the principles credible.
To begin the search for the principles
of justice, then, we are to imagine a group of people in what Rawls calls
"the original position," a hypothetical situation in which no rules
yet exist. Neither the people involved nor the situation are
real. Both are idealized, and the first part of Rawls's thought experiment
involves deciding what requirements to place on these people in order to ensure
that the principles they would select are correct.
One restriction is that people in the
original position must be regarded as having an equal voice and as agreeing
freely to whatever principles they adopt. To see why these
conditions of equality and uncoerced agreement are important, imagine a group
that agrees to appoint George as the dictator of all and accepts the
principle "do whatever George says." They select this principle
because George has a powerful weapon and has threatened to kill everyone who
opposes this rule. Because people accept this principle only under the threat
of force, we would not take it seriously as a principle of justice. We will
treat principles that emerge from the original position as correct only if they
emerge from the free, uncoerced consent of equal parties. So, we are to imagine
that the people in the original position are free and equal in this way.
A second condition is that people in
the original position must be rational. The reason for this is obvious. If they
are not rational, we will have no reason to take seriously the results of their
deliberations. We must be assured that the principles are not tile result of
irrational acceptance.
Third, Rawls proposes that people in the original position
must have a good understanding of human nature and human societies. The
principles of justice are meant to provide a workable basis for social life. If
their acceptance rests on false beliefs about individuals and social institutions,
this will discredit them. The principles must be based on good information
about human beings and human society.
A related point concerns the
motivation of the people in the original position. Suppose that they are all
extreme altruists and always put the interests of others first. While we might
admire them for their virtue, we might also think that the rules that a group
of saints would accept might not be suitable for normal people to live by.
Normal people have a mixture of motivations. We may care about other people
generally, but we tend to care most deeply about advancing our own interests
and the interests of people who are near and dear to us.
To take account of these facts about
human motivation, Rawls assumes that people in the original position are
concerned with advancing their own interests. They want to make sure that
their own lives will go well, and they want principles of justice that will
protect them from various kinds of bad conditions.
In addition, Rawls supposes that these
people are, as he says, "mutually disinterested." That is, when they
deliberate about what principles to adopt, they do so from a perspective of
concern for themselves and not for others. Each is trying to strike the best
bargain for himself and does not worry about others. This does not mean that
Rawls thinks that actual people are selfish or egotistical. Rather, he thinks
that if we make the principles acceptable to people who care about themselves,
then those principles will protect the basic interests of all. Again, we would
not want principles that presuppose extreme altruism. The most credible
principles are those that would be acceptable to "mutually
disinterested" people who are concerned with advancing their own
interests.
THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE
One of the most important, conditions
that Rawls places on the people in the original position is the "veil of
ignorance." According to Rawls, the people in the original position must
be ignorant of any particular facts about themselves. They cannot know who
they are, what features they possess, or what specific position they will
occupy in society. This may seem like a strange condition, but it is crucial
to obtaining agreement on rules that are appropriate.
To see why the veil of ignorance is necessary, imagine that A
and B are in the original position and are considering whether to adopt rules
that permit slavery. If they know that A will be a master and B will be a slave
and if they are concerned about pursuing their own advantage, then A
will favor a system that permits slavery while B will reject this system.
Agreement will be impossible, since both will simply reason in an unconstrained
way about what will benefit them. We all recognize, however, that the claim
"this will benefit me" or "this will harm me" is not an
argument for the justice or injustice of an institution. The veil of ignorance
is a means for disallowing such claims.
To see how it works, consider A and B
again. If we place them behind the veil of ignorance, then neither knows
whether he will be a slave or a master. Since neither one
will want to be a slave and since neither one can know in advance what
status he will have in a slave society, they must reject slavery altogether. In
order to prevent themselves from being treated in an intolerable way, they
must adopt principles that prohibit anyone from being treated that way. The
only way to prevent the possibility of being a slave oneself is to adopt a
principle that prohibits the institution of slavery. The veil of ignorance
forces this choice, acting as an information shield that makes it impossible
to adopt rules that advantage some at the expense of' others.
This example highlights one of the key
features of Rawls's view. There are certain conditions (such as being a slave)
that any person would find intolerable. In order to protect oneself from being
in that position, each person in the original position must insist on
principles that guarantee no one should be in such a position. The resulting
principles of justice prohibit forms of treatment that no one would want for
themselves.
To summarize Rawls's method, then, he
argues that the correct principles of justice are the ones that would be chosen
by people who are free, equal, rational, knowledgeable about human nature and
society, concerned about promoting their own well-being, mutually
disinterested, and ignorant of their own identity and place in society. To say
that a principle of justice is correct is to say that it would be chosen by
people in this situation.
THE TWO PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE
Rawls believes that people in the
original position would choose two basic principles of justice, one for
distributing basic political and civil liberties and one for distributing
social and economic goods.
Here is the first principle:
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
total system of
basic liberties compatible with a similar
system of liberty for all. (250)
The "basic liberties" that Rawls has in mind here
are things such as freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of religion,
freedom of political participation, and
the protections of the "rule of law" (such as prohibition of
arbitrary arrest, guarantees of due process of law. The liberties protected by the first principle
are the familiar liberties of a liberal democratic state. They provide e people
with rights to
influence the political process as citizens, and they create a system of immunities from interference by
the government. In a just society everyone will possess these liberties
equally.
While these political and civil liberties may not seem
related to issues of economic justice,
the political and economic realms are interconnected in many ways. No state, Rawls thinks, can be just if it
does not provide its citizens with these basic liberties. This is true even if
it succeeds in making people economically prosperous. Rawls thinks that the
political and civil liberties are so important, that he gives them priority
over economic rights. He does this by saying that
his first principle has "lexical priority'' over the second principle.
The basic political and civil liberties come first; they may not be traded away or denied in
order to promote economic progress.
Rawls's second principle concerns the distribution of 'social
and economic goods. He develops it in two stages. In the first version,
he writes:
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that
they are both
(a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to
positions and offices open to all. (60)
This principle expresses three
important ideas. First, it tells us that justice permits "social and
economic inequalities"; it does not require that everyone have the same amount of
resources. Second, however, it requires that the overall system of distribution
must be advantageous to all. Third, it insists that if higher rewards attach
to some occupations, the opportunity to obtain those occupations must be open
to all people.
As stated, this principle is not very
definite about the nature of a just distribution of resources. Rawls considers
several ways of making the principle more specific and finally settles on the
one he calls "the difference principle." Its job is to tell us how much economic
inequality is permitted by the principles of justice. The new version of the
second principle contains two new features. It reads as follows:
Social and economic inequalities are
to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity. (83)
One change is contained in condition (b). It specifies that
the greater rewards that attach to certain positions in society are just only
if everyone has "fair equality of opportunity" to compete for those
positions. The ideal of "fair equality of opportunity" requires that
a just society provide some degree of education and training to everyone,
independent of their ability to pay for it. If justice is to permit the greater
rewards that go with some occupations, then the competition for those positions
must be fair, and in order for the competition to be fair, people must have
more than a legal right to apply for positions. They must also have some
resources invested in the development of their skills so they can compete
effectively. This is the moral basis for the view that government must provide
everyone with a free education, at least up to a certain grade level.
THE DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE
Many people think that if government
provides free education for all, that is enough to create fair opportunities,
and no further action is required to achieve economic justice. Rawls disagrees,
and this is why he adds condition (a) to the second principle of justice. This
condition, known as the "difference principle," says that economic
inequalities are just only if their existence is "to the greatest benefit
of the least advantaged." This means that economic inequalities can be
just but only if they are part of a system that maximizes the well-being of
those who possess least.
In order to make clear how the
principle works, it will be useful to recall a comparison discussed in Chapter
4. Consider the following distributions of resources:
|
|
Situation A |
Situation B |
Situation C |
|
Person 1 |
1000 |
1250 |
1000 |
|
Person 2 |
1000 |
1250 |
1000 |
|
Person 3 |
1000 |
2000 |
2500 |
Situation A is a pure egalitarian
distribution: Everyone has exactly the same amount. In situation B, one person
has more than the others, but the others' holdings are increased too. If we
assume that giving person 3 less than 2000 would result in less than 1250 for
persons 1 and 2, then situation B satisfies the difference principle. Rawls
would say that the move from A to B is just.
By contrast, if we move to C, person 3 improves his holdings, but I and
2 are not brought up. Situation C is unjust according to the difference
principle.
While this chart illustrates the key
idea of the difference principle, there is one way in which it misrepresents
Rawls's view. Rawls is concerned with what he calls the "basic
structure" of society. He is not concerned with the amounts of resources
that particular individuals possess. So, in making these comparisons, we should
be thinking not about particular persons but rather about socioeconomic groups.
The following chart better represents Rawls's concerns (although he does not
identify these specific groups).
|
|
Situation A |
Situation B |
Situation C |
|
Unskilled worker |
1000 |
1250 |
1000 |
|
Skilled worker |
1000 |
1250 |
1000 |
|
Company Executive |
1000 |
2000 |
2500 |
Rawls is concerned with the level of
resources going to persons occupying particular social roles or statuses. That
is what the basic principles of justice are about. They are a means of judging
the basic structure of society and only apply secondarily to individuals.
Rawls's adoption of the difference
principle shows that he accepts the idea that a system that permits
inequalities may provide incentives that will result in benefits for all.
Inequalities can be just if they have this positive effect.
In earlier chapters, this incentive
argument came up as part of an argument for capitalism and the market system.
As we saw, many people claim that greater rewards for some can lead to
increased productive activity and thus to a greater pool of resources for
increasing everyone's well-being. A major argument for market capitalism is
that it has this effect. Its defenders claim that while some people acquire
more resources than others, even those at the bottom are made better off by
the general increase in social productivity.
By embracing this argument, Rawls
seems to accept the logic of what is sometimes called "trickle down"
economics. This is the view that greater benefits for wealthy people
"trickle-down" to -- and thus benefit -- less well-off people.
Rawls's difference principle differs
from "trickle-down" economics in a number of significant ways,
however. First, it makes benefits for less well-off people a necessary
condition of the justice of greater rewards for others. If the benefits for all
that are said to arise from providing incentives do not actually occur, then
Rawls requires that a purely egalitarian distribution be created. While most
"trickle-down" theorists do not take equality seriously, Rawls sees
it as the point to which we should return if increased rewards to some do not
in fact benefit all.
Second, the expression "trickle
down" suggests that the wealthy will have large amounts of resources while
the amount that reaches people at lower levels will just be a trickle, a small
amount. Rawls's difference principle,
however, demands that inequalities be set up so as to maximize the well-being
of people at the bottom of the economic ladder. This strongly suggests that a
substantial amount of resources (not just a trickle) must find its way to poorer people if the
holdings of the better off are to be justified.
Finally, since Rawls's theory requires
that inequalities must maximize the well-being of the poor in order to be just,
this suggests that every increase in inequality must be justified in terms of
its improving the lot of the least well off. Only if it has this effect can an
inequality be justified. For this reason, it might be more appropriate to call
Rawls's view a "trickle-up" theory, since every movement of resources
upward and away from equality must be justified by its tendency to promote the
well-being of the least well off. Rather than simply hoping that the benefits
of inequality will trickle down, Rawls's difference principle requires them to
benefit the least well off. If they do not, then justice forbids them, and an
equal distribution would be required.
DEFENDING THE DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE
How does Rawls defend the difference
principle? How does he show that it expresses the correct principle of justice
regarding the distribution of social and economic goods?
Recall that for Rawls the best way to
show that a principle of justice is correct is by showing that it would be
adopted by people in the original position. This is precisely what Rawls tries
to do for the difference principle. He
tries to show why the difference principle would be adopted in the original
position by people who are free, equal, rational, knowledgeable about human
nature and society, concerned to promote their own well-being, mutually
disinterested, and ignorant of their own identity and place in society.
The argument for accepting the
difference principle has two parts because the principle itself has two parts.
The first part states a presumption in favor of an equal distribution, while
the second describes a condition under which an unequal distribution becomes
permissible. So, in showing why the difference principle would be chosen, we
need to know why people would choose equality as the starting point and then
why they would be willing to move away from equality.
Why would they choose equality as a
starting point? Each person is concerned with advancing his own interests and
is not interested in advancing or diminishing the interests of others. That
means that each one wants the best possible result for herself and does not
have either an altruistic desire to make others better off or a hostile desire
to make them worse off. So, each person will want as good a personal situation
as possible.
In addition, because the terms of the
contract must be acceptable to all, each person knows that an arrangement that
makes some people better off than others will be rejected by those who do less
well. At this stage, there is no reason to accept such inequalities. So, as a
first step, the proposal of an equal distribution is the only one that would be
agreed to by all.
Once we have gotten to this point,
then the question is: Why
would people ever agree to anything other than an equal
distribution? The answer is that if an
unequal distribution will make every person better off, then everyone would
accept this -- again because all are concerned with advancing their own interests.
Recall the choice discussed earlier.
|
|
Situation A |
Situation B |
|
Unskilled
worker |
1000 |
1250 |
|
Skilled
worker |
1000 |
1250 |
|
Company
executive |
1000 |
2000 |
If we begin with the strict equality
of situation A and can then show that allowing company executives to be better
off, will result in improving everyone's situation, then both the
skilled and unskilled workers will find situation B preferable to situation A.
Now consider a different choice, a move from situation B to
situation D.
|
|
Situation B |
Situation D |
|
Unskilled
worker |
1250 |
800 |
|
Skilled
worker |
1250 |
1550 |
|
Company
executive |
2000 |
2500 |
By moving to situation D, two groups
are made better off, but people in the lowest position are made less well off.
This move would be condemned by the difference principle, since it creates
inequalities that are not "to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged."
Would the move from B to D he rejected
in the original position? Rawls argues
that it would. Because the veil of ignorance prevents people from knowing what
position they will occupy in society everyone knows that they may end up in the
lowest position. For that reason, they will want to ensure that the position of
the least well off is as good as possible.
But, one might object, why wouldn't
people in the original position be willing to gamble? It they permit
inequalities like those in situation D and if they wind up in a better
position, their gains will be larger. Maybe those larger gains are so good that
they are worth the risk that one might lose and end up in the bad position.
Rawls rules out this gambling
strategy, claiming that people in the original position would follow what is
called a "maximin" strategy. They will aim not for the highest
possible winnings but rather for a situation in which, even if they lose, their
losing situation will be as good as possible. They will want to prevent finding
themselves in an intolerable position.
To illustrate this, recall our
discussion of slavery. If one chooses a slave system, that
would be a huge gamble. One could win big by being a master or lose badly by
being a slave. People looking for the biggest gains will take this risk, but,
Rawls says, because this is such an important choice, rational people in the
original position will be very conservative. They will not gamble in this way
because the costs of losing are too great. To lose and find oneself a slave
would be intolerable.
So, the general outcome of the
original position deliberations is that people will accept a principle that
permits only those inequalities that make the position of the worst off as good
as possible. This is precisely what the difference principle does.
A SECOND RAWLSIAN ARGUMENT
Earlier in this chapter, I contrasted the wide-ranging,
informal arguments that I have used with the theoretically unified method that
Rawls develops through his use of the social contract idea. In addition to his
"official" social contract argument for the difference principle,
however, Rawls has another informal argument for it. Since this informal
argument contains some important ideas, I will briefly describe it here.
When Rawls first introduces the second principle of justice,
it does not include the difference principle. It says:
[S]ocial and economic inequalities are
to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to
everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.
(60)
The difference principle is introduced later as the proper
interpretation of the second principle. Before adopting it, Rawls mentions two
other interpretations and explains why he rejects them.
The first interpretation involves what he calls the
"system of natural liberty." By this, he means libertarian
capitalism, a pure market system. According to this system, any distribution is
just as long as (a) it is not the product of force or fraud, and (b) everyone
has a right to compete for higher-paying positions. Within this system, having
a "right to compete" means that there are no legal prohibitions on
eligibility for positions. No one is prohibited by law front competing for
positions that carry greater social and economic rewards.
In the system of natural liberty,
then, different people compete for positions, and those who win better
positions acquire a greater share of' resources. No limit is placed on the
amount that anyone can acquire. Nor is anyone guaranteed access to any
resources.
Rawls rejects this libertarian system because he thinks that
the distribution of
resources it produces will be too heavily influenced by the
prior distribution of natural ... talents
and abilities . . . as these have been developed or left unrealized, and their
use favored or disfavored ... by social circumstances [,] ... accident and
good fortune. (72)
Rawls's concern is that if we simply
let people compete for resources, then whether people win or lose will be
heavily influenced by the natural talents that people have (or lack) plus the
beneficial or harmful social circumstances in which people find themselves. Some people are born with traits that will make
them good competitors in the market, but others are not. Some are born in
social circumstances that are conducive to the development of traits and
abilities that will help them succeed, but others are not. Among the
fundamental determinants of success and failure, then, will be factors over
which people have little or no control, and Rawls thinks this is unjust. As he
writes,
Intuitively, the most obvious
injustice of the system of natural liberty is that it permits distributive shares to be improperly
influenced by ... factors that are] arbitrary from a moral point of 'view.
(72)
Rawls's argument against the system of
natural liberty has a good deal of plausibility. Few of us think that the
accidents of birth and social circumstance should determine a person's life
prospects. That is the way a caste system or hereditary hierarchy works. Yet,
the system of
natural liberty, Rawls suggests, is morally similar. People do compete and make
efforts, but their ability to succeed depends to a great extent on the
advantages and disadvantages that they happen to have inherited from nature or
acquired front their social circumstances.
FAIR EQUALITY OF
One response to this problem is for
society to use its resources to help people prepare to compete in the market.
Instead of providing everyone with the merely formal, legal right to compete,
proponents of fair equal opportunity acknowledge that everyone should have a
fair chance to win. This requires providing all with education, training, and
other goods that give them a real chance to succeed in the competition for more
favored positions in society.
Rawls does not oppose these steps. He
thinks they are necessary, but he does not think they are sufficient to
guarantee that the resulting distribution is just. There are two basic reasons
for this. First, even if the system succeeds in eliminating the advantages
that some get through the social contingencies of being born into a well-off
family, "it still permits the distribution of wealth and income to be
determined by the natural distribution of abilities and talents" (73-4).
Even the most, effective program to even out social advantages and
disadvantages would leave significant, morally arbitrary factors in place -- the
advantages and disadvantages that come with genetic makeup. These would still
play a very important role in affecting the outcome of economic competition.
The second problem is that the
advantages and disadvantages that accompany social contingencies cannot be done
away with. This is because the development of natural capacities is so heavily
influenced by the family and the social position in which people find
themselves. "Even the willingness to make an effort, to try," he
says, "is itself dependent upon happy family and social
circumstances." (74) As long as we leave the family intact, the advantages
and disadvantages of social circumstance cannot be undone. Rawls is emphatic on
this point. "It is impossible," he writes, "to secure equal
chances of achievement" for all. Rather than denying this fact, he
suggests that we "adopt a principle that recognizes this fact and also
mitigates the arbitrary effects of the natural lottery itself" (74).
The difference principle succeeds
where these fail. It does not make access to resources totally dependent on the
contingencies of nature or social circumstance. Taking seriously the moral
worth of every member of society, it guarantees a tolerable level of
well-being for all. It does this by channeling the distribution of goods
through a system that permits
inequalities but only insofar as the, benefit the worst off. For
Rawls, a just society will not simply consign those who cannot compete effectively in the market to
an intolerably low status.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WELFARE STATE
Rawls's arguments give us another way
to understand the moral basis for the welfare state. As we saw earlier, a
welfare state is one that provides a legal right to access to at least some
resources for all citizens, while at the same time permitting private
property, a market system, and some degree of inequality.
Rawls has two main arguments why such
a state is required by justice. First, and most important, it is the kind of
state that we ourselves would choose if we were in the ideal circumstances of
the original position. We would all agree to this kind of society because no
matter what position we end up occupying, we
will have the same basic liberties as others. In addition, even if we end up
in the economically worst off position, the difference principle guarantees
that this is the best we could hope for. If inequalities were done away with,
our own less good position would be still worse. So, whatever inequalities
exist are justified.
Rawls's second, more informal argument
gives further support to the claim that a welfare state is superior to a pure
market system. A pure market system rewards the winners of economic competition and we
might think that the winners deserve their superior rewards. On reflection,
however, it is
clear that who wins is heavily influenced by natural and social contingencies,
the luck of the draw that determines what our genetically inherited traits are
and whether our social situation is conducive to developing the skills and
traits necessary for successful competition.
For Rawls, there is nothing unjust
about the fact that people acquire different traits or circumstances, but it is
unjust if society allows inherited
traits and circumstances to determine people's life prospects. As he writes:
The natural distribution [of inherited traits]
is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust
that men are born into
society at some particular position.
These are simply natural facts. What is
just and unjust
is the way that
institutions deal with these facts...
The social system is not an unchangeable order beyond human control. (102)
It is important, then, that we
distinguish the natural order from the social order. While there are some facts
of nature that we must simply accept, we do not have to accept social outcomes
that are based on natural facts. Instead, we can and should alter social
outcomes in accord with the principles of justice. This is what Rawls's theory
requires. As he says,
In justice as fairness men agree to share one another's fate.
In designing institutions they undertake to avail themselves of the accidents
of nature and social circumstance only when doing so is for the common benefit.
The two principles are a fair way of meeting, the arbitrariness of
fortune. ...(102)
While Rawls draws on different
arguments from the ones I have used, the result of his reflections is extremely
friendly to the conclusions I have defended. His criterion of economic justice
permits significant economic inequalities, but it permits them only when they are
necessary to make the position of the least well off as good as possible. He believes that a just society cannot leave people at the mercy
of the marketplace and rejects libertarian capitalism because it permits unjust
inequalities. Rawls also gives priority to protecting political and civil
liberties. For this reason, he would reject those forms of socialism that have
been willing to sacrifice civil and political rights to achieve economic
equality. In addition, he rejects
socialism because it insists on a stricter form of equality than is actually
required by justice. These conclusions are all consistent with my defense of a
welfare state, and some form of welfare state seems to be best suited to
realizing Rawls's principles.
EVALUATING RAWLSIAN JUSTICE
At the start of this chapter, I
suggested that Rawls's theory might help us to do two things: understand more
fully the moral basis of the welfare state and begin to determine how much a
welfare state should provide for its citizens. Having described the basic
components of Rawls's theory, I now want to see how helpful the theory is. My
intent is not to
provide a complete assessment
of Rawls's theory. Instead, I will focus on three questions that are
most relevant to my
inquiry into the nature of economic justice.
First, what is the value of Rawls's social contract method?
Second, does the difference principle correctly state the
requirements of economic justice?
Third, does Rawls's theory help us to decide what level of
resources a just society will provide for its citizens? [Nathanson’s answers to the second and third
questions are not included in this selection.]
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT METHOD
There are two extreme views that might
be taken about Rawls's social contract method of argument According to one view
(sometimes suggested by Rawls but never fully embraced),
a social contract argument is the only appropriate kind of argument for
defending principles of justice. The opposite extreme view is that social
contract arguments are artificial, irrelevant, and unhelpful.
My own view is that the social
contract argument is one form of argument we can draw on and that we should use
it along with others. While it is not absolutely, necessary to
inquiries about justice, neither is it pointless or irrelevant.
Why is the social contract method not
necessary? Because there are many kinds of arguments that people give to defend
views about justice, and any argument that can be seen to have a point merits
consideration. Arguments need not take any specific form. They may appeal to
general principles, or they may appeal to examples of just or unjust practices.
They may invoke historical experience, economic theories, or theories of' human
nature. Indeed, they may emerge from novels, stories, plays, and even from
jokes and songs. Anything that seems relevant should be examined, whether it is
cast in the form of a social contract argument or not.
To say this, however, is not to
denigrate the contract method. Rawls's theory is, I think, very helpful in
thinking about problems of economic justice. It is helpful in part because it
changes our perspective in useful ways. All of us are used to a certain
repertoire of slogans and arguments about wealth and poverty, justice and
injustice. Often, when we engage in political and moral debate, we quickly
settle into familiar ruts and simply reproduce the slogans and arguments we
have heard before. We need ways to free ourselves from rigid, ritualized forms
of thought, and Rawls's social contract method can help us do that.
In addition, since all of us have
vested interests either in change or in the preservation of the current order,
our reasoning may be influenced by concerns about our own personal well-being.
While we know that the fact that an arrangement benefits ourselves is not
strictly relevant to deciding whether it is just or unjust, we may nonetheless
be influenced in our judgments by concerns about our own well-being.
Rawls's contract method is helpful in
two ways. First, by requiring a different kind of thought exercise, it helps
us get out of the ruts of conventional thinking and thus makes possible a fresh
view. Second, by imposing the veil of ignorance, it prevents us front giving
too much weight to the advantages or disadvantages that we personally derive
from our current institutions. It forces,
us to argue in ways that give equal weight to everyone's well-being.
That our thinking about justice can be contaminated by concern for our own interests is powerfully brought out by the nineteenth century economist, Jean-Baptiste Say. He writes:
Persons, who under a vicious order of things have obtained a competent share of social enjoyments, are never in want of arguments to justify . . . such a state of society. ... If the same individuals were tomorrow required to cast anew the lots assigning them it place in society, they would find many things to object to.
Say brings out the relation between our degree of personal
contentment with a social system and our belief about whether the system is
just. We feel that a social order is justifiable because it is fine for us. Say
makes this vivid by imagining a lottery to assign new places. As he correctly
notes, people's attitudes toward a system might well change if they could not
count on retaining an advantageous position within it.'
The same kind of unsettling effect is
produced by Rawls's thought experiment and by the prospect of renegotiating
the social contract from a position of ignorance about our own situation.
Whatever its faults, the method has inspired a great deal of new thinking. One
can praise it for its fruitfulness without thinking it is the only legitimate
form of social thought.